Joel Balicki

Poland: The Russian Dilemma

2016

 

Abstract

This paper analyzes Poland’s national security policy regarding Russia, through the theoretical lens of realism and strategic culture. The theoretical frameworks of realism and strategic culture provide the most applicable framework to analyze the issue of nation-state security in Eastern Europe. Russia has always posed a significant national security threat to Poland. Recently, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the invasion of Crimea in 2014 do nothing but support that notion. There exists a constant state of tension due to political, religious, governmental, and ideological dissimilarities. In addition, analysis of the Polish military and their security decisions is crucial in how Poland perceives itself in relation to its substantial eastern neighbor.

Introduction

Poland’s geographical position in Eastern Europe, is in many ways, a national security nightmare. Poland’s location between two major powers, Germany and Russia, makes many Poles on edge and based on history, rightly so. The mostly flat (with an exception of the southern mountains Zakopane) terrain makes Poland’s defensibility highly difficult. Russian President Vladimir Putin has exhibited highly aggressive behavior in recent years, including the invasion of Georgia in 2008, and the ongoing Ukrainian Civil war. As the United States downsizes its forces and commitment to mainland Europe, Poland’s security is once again in jeopardy. This research is aimed at answering what Poland’s national security strategy is in regards to Russia. The research question is, how does realism and strategic culture explain Poland’s national security strategy in regards to Russia? The theoretical frameworks of realism and security culture are the lens through which Polish national security will be analyzed. Both nations have a Slavic origin, yet are so very different in many respects. There are variations in language, religion, and political ideology. History has proved that Polish-Russian relations have been violent and in a constant state of tension. I will put into context what we understand modern Poland to be and why is it so very different from Russia despite sharing similar ancestral origins. I will also address the perception of Poland from several standpoints, including that of Poles and their perception of Russians and the Russian system of government. Poles have often looked to share an identity with the West, yet perceptions of Poland vary greatly outside of Poland. To many, Poland is in the East and in the Russian sphere of influence. Through the lenses of realism and strategic culture, I will assess Polish politics and how domestic political dynamics impact national security decisions against Russia. Sub sections will include analysis on military capability, NATO, and ideological perception. Overall, this is a topic that is important in order to better understand the complexity and fragility of Eastern European relations and regional security.

Realism and strategic culture are the two main analytic components of this research. Both of these theories alone attempt to answer the way states interact at the international level. According to Stephen Walt in International Relations: One World Many Theories, “Realism emphasizes the enduring propensity for conflict between states.” (Walt, 1998). Realism has four main assumptions, they are as follows: states are principal actors, states are unitary actors, we make the assumption that states act rationally (rational actor); and there is a hierarchy of issues with national security being at the top (Viotti and Kauppi, pg39). Power, a core concept for realists largely deals with the fact that states are constantly seeking it. The anarchical state of the international system leads states to act in their best interest because there is no higher authority. In addition, this inherent anarchical nature causes skepticism in an already tense situation (Viotti and Kauppi pg57). States must make value maximizing choices in order to survive. Sometimes, the best choice or most value maximizing choice is a choice in which you receive a satisfactory result (Viotti and Kauppi).

Strategic culture, on the other hand, takes a different approach to international relations and national security. Whereas Realism was a popular theoretical approach during the Cold War, strategic culture has gained traction during the post- Cold War period. According to Jeannie L. Johnson, “Strategic Culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior derived from common experiences and accepted narratives, that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.” (Johnson, pg5). Compared to realism, where domestic factors, religion, ideology, history, etc. are virtually irrelevant, strategic culture identifies those factors as key components to a state’s national security decision making policy. It is essential to evaluate how the people or group within a state identify themselves, especially relative to other groups of people. “Nearly all strategic culture analysts spend a good deal of time articulating aspects of national culture which play a role in influencing security policy.” (Johnson, pg10). Overall, strategic culture focuses on internal domestic factors that play a role in states decision making.

Literature Review

There is ample literature regarding Russia and its history and capabilities. Finding similar literature on Poland was more complicated, but in many ways, quality definitely outweighs quantity. To begin, the theoretical frameworks of Realism and Security Culture stem from international relations theory and politics. General background knowledge of Realism and Security Culture is necessary in order to apply each theory. The book, International Relations Theory, written by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V Kauppi (Pearson Education Inc. 2012) is an in-depth overview on the theory of realism in international relations. Viotti and Kauppi explain the four major assumptions of realism and the fact that there are multiple sub sections of realism, to include Neo-realism, structural realism, classical realism, and other theories. (Viotti and Kauppi). The key notion of the state and the balance of power in realism is thoroughly addressed throughout the literature. Stephen Walt’s journal article, International Relations: One World, Many Theories, (Foreign Policy, 1998) is another additional source on the topic of realism and its core concepts. Stephen Walt is an important figure in academia regarding foreign policy, and his insight into realism and how states act on the international stage will aid in my analysis of Polish Russian national security relations. The second theoretical framework is strategic culture. Strategic Culture and National Security Policy, (Blackwell Publishing, 2002) by Jeffrey Lantis provides a different point of view than realism. It is important to recognize that both of these theories can provide insight or explanations for international relations and states actions toward one another. In different circumstances, there are different applications. The focus of Lantis’s work is that culture impacts states decisions moreso than power and that there are shared assumptions and rules that prompt strategic culture. Jeannie L. Johnson in, Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct, (Reduction Agency USA, 2006) very much aligns with Lantis’s work. Johnson defines and refines the concept of strategic culture giving a clearer depiction of its core meaning and definition. In short, realism and strategic culture both can be applied simaltaniously and provide an even better explanation for states actions.

Next, Robert Beckhusens article, Don’t Mess with Poland, (Medium.com 2014) deals mostly with the Polish military and its capabilities. It explains Polands search for power, perhaps even more specifically defensive capabilities. It provides a perspective supportive of Poland. This perspective plays a role in analysis, especially when studying the cultural, political, and religious identity of the Poles. Moving on, the next source is similar to the source mentioned above, but there are come crucial differences. George Freidman in, Polands Strategy, (Geopolitical Weekly, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2012) released “Poland’s Strategy”, a journal article analysis which provides information about Poland’s situation from a military and national security persepective. It is an unbiased source that comprehensively looks into Poland’s situation in Europe. It provides useful information on Polands military role and what makes its defensibility very difficult. Poland is situated in Eastern Europe and has faced threats from both the east and west. It is a difficult geopolitical situation and an even more difficult strategic defensability situation. It is a useful piece in understanding the strategic capabilites of Poland as well as the gaps in defensibility and security.

Next, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, is a primary document written and released by Poland’s National Security Bureau in 2014, designed to inform the public on the beliefs and intentions of the Polish government in relation to matters of national security. It is on its own because compared to other sources, it comes directly from the government dealing with exactly what this research topic is about. It is an invaluable source because it provides crucial insight into Polish governmental beliefs and decision making. Military details as well as political beliefs are included in the governmental release. In addition, Matthew Day’s media article, Russia Simulates Nuclear Attack on Poland, (Telegraph, 2009) initially appears to deal with the realm of military security, but in many ways it also shows how politics plays a significant role in military operations. Russian military excercises do appear to be a demonstration of hard power and no doubt a strategy to provoke political outrage in Poland.

Moving forward, Patrick H. O’Neil, Karl Fields, and Don Share’s book, Cases in Comparative Politics, (W.W Norton and Company, 2013) provides a chapter about Russia and their situation, ideology, history, political makeup, and various other topics. It is an informational piece, unbiased, and it provides research about Poland’s nemesis. Understanding Russia is crucial to understanding many of the reasons that make Poland what it is and why its ideology is so vastly different. It is important to establish crucial differences between Poland and Russia for the purposes of this research. Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan’s piece of literature, Modern NonDemocratic Regimes, (W.W. Norton and Company, 2013) provides background information on Soviet type regimes, which Poland was. There were actually several disctinct differneces between the Polish communist state compared to the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc states. There is a conflict as to what type of regime was in place in Poland during that time period. Some argue totalitarian, others argue authoritarian. It is important to distinguish the differences between Polands communist experience and the Soviets. Building on this idea of the Polish communist experience, is the transition to democracy. In an interview with Michael Mikos, Polish Language and Culture Professor at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, current political developments and Polish perceptions of Russians were discussed. There exist crucial ideoligical, systemic, and historical rifts for Poles toward the Russians. Marek Chodakiewicz’s, Agent Bolek, (Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, 2009) suppliments the Mikos interview because Chodakiewicz delves into Russian invisible control in the Polish government and how Poles have responded to this recent development. Polish democratic transition still has remnants of Cold War leadership. Modern Poles are facing a political dilemma, one that history plays a crucial role in. Additionally, Consolidating Democracy in Poland, (Westview Press, Inc. 1995) by Raymond Taras exquisitely discusses Polands democratic transition and the underlying factors that led to that democratization. Again, democratization plays a substantial role in the Polish identity. To many it is believed that Poland was one of the worst places to implement communism and a general grasp of why, is interelated with the Polish identity at its roots. In addition, it provides a brief outline of external factors that may have influenced Poland’s democratization. For example, western democratic states and the Catholic Church played a large role in influencing Polands transition.

Politics and Culture are two major components of Poland’s behavior toward Russia, therfore references to media outlets are vital. Sputnik International released an article, “New Polish President: Putin can walk all over me, but he won’t wake me up”, (2015) the name of the article being a direct quote from newly elected Polish President Andrzej Duda. This article expresses Duda’s opinion of Russia and Putin. Duda is the elected political leader of Poland and his opinion holds a lot of influence. The political dissatisfaction of Poland towards Russia explains a lot about the relationship of the two states.

Methods

The primary method in this research is the case study. The paper is comprised of a detailed case study of Polish national security policy and its underlying variables in regard to Russia. Due to the specific nature of my research, the case study provides the best way to relay and analyze the information. In addition, the research includes qualitative data. Qualitative data provides the best platform for explaining the Polish situation. The aim is to gather data in order to answer why and how questions. This is something that quantitative data does not necessarily address. Most existing research comprises of case studies, aimed at answering the why and how. Previous research will help supplement my case study analysis.

Body

1. Polish History

Polish history, especially in the 20^th century, was dark to say the least. Poland was ravaged by several wars, lost millions of people during the holocaust, and then suffered at the hands of Soviet oppression and a communist regime for nearly fifty years. A large portion of this suffering can be attributed to Russia and its unwarranted, aggressive brutality against Poles. “Much historical evidence suggests that the original home of all Slavs was territory that came to be ruled by Polish kings between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries.” (Taras pg24). Despite shared Slavic origins, Polish-Russian relations have always been tense.

In 966, Christianity reached Poland. Its popularity grew, in particular the Catholic Church, which gained significant power and influence and still does to this day. Nevertheless, different religious groups coexisted in Poland for many years, to include a large Jewish population. After time, Poland’s influence in Europe grew. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which lasted from the mid to late 1500’s to the late 1700’s was the regional hegemon. In 1791, Poles created the first constitution in Europe, and second in the world behind the United States. According to the University of Buffalo, Polish Academic Information Center, “The Polish Parliament approved on May 3, 1791, a new democratic Constitution, which the King straightaway signed.” (University of Buffalo 2000). Shortly thereafter, the once great commonwealth, like all other prominent civilizations declined and underwent partitioning, Russia being one of the main entities to partition Poland. Essentially, “The autocratic rulers in the countries surrounding Poland thought Poland’s Constitution to be a dangerous precedent. What if their subjects were to demand a greater say in government? This Constitution, in their view, could not be allowed to stand. Soon a Russian army invaded Poland.” (University of Buffalo 2000). The Polish territory under Russian control prohibited progress and kept Poles suppressed. In 1918, Poland finally gained its sovereignty again after World War I. This was called the Second Polish Republic. After the Soviet-Bolsheviks took power in Russia, they turned their sights to the rest of Europe and to spread their cause. There was one democratic nation standing in their way, Poland. The Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919-1921 was started by Lenin and his communist Bolsheviks in order to spread communism throughout mainland Europe, in particular Germany. Poles advanced into Soviet territory, were pushed back into Poland and the Bolshevik’s advances halted at Warszawa. The battle known as “Bitwa Warszawska” (Battle of Warsaw) in 1920 was a significant Polish victory. It crippled Lenin’s Bolshevik army and they never fully recovered. The Poles led by Jozef Pilsudski, pushed the Soviet-Bolsheviks all the way back across disputed eastern territories. Shortly thereafter, the Peace of Riga was signed ending the fighting between the two forces. After nearly 20 years of relative peace, World War II broke out, Poland was once again at the mercy of the Germans and Soviets. The massacre at Katyn, committed by the Soviets under the cover of the Katyn Forrest, was a devastating blow to Polish military forces. Tens of thousands of Polish military officers, police officers, intelligentsia agents, and others were massacred and thrown in mass graves. To this day, many Russians continue to deny responsibility despite ample evidence of their actions. Small pockets of Polish resistance forces from the 400,000 member Armia Krajowa (largest resistance movement of WWII), fought the Soviets as well as the Germans. Valiant efforts by the Ruch Oporu and other underground groups to prevent communist control were eventually silenced by Soviet military forces and secret police. Soon after, a communist government was set up in Poland, a puppet of the Soviet Kremlin. Perhaps the one organization that was most effective in sustaining Polish identity during communism was the Catholic Church. In fact, Poland had the only religiously affiliated university in the entire Eastern Bloc. The University is called Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski or the Catholic University of Lublin and is still operating today. Poles endured until 1989, after the solidarity movement had taken its toll on the communist government democracy was once again here for Poland. “A huge round table was constructed and talks were held around it. The Round Table Talks resulted in and compromise agreement between the communist regime and the leaders of Solidarity to hold semi-free elections. These led to an overwhelming victory for Solidarity and the communists were forced to cede power to a democratic government.” (University of Buffalo 2000). Democratization does not come without its hardships, but Poland’s progress, especially economically has been second to none in relation to other post-soviet bloc states. As Russia continues to seek power, in particular militarily, the tension between the two states continues to fester. Putin’s blatant aggressive behavior in Georgia and Ukraine in recent years has only compounded the problem. In this current tension filled state of affairs, how does Realism and Strategic Culture explain Poland’s national security policy in regard to Russia?

2. Strategic Culture

Poland is in a period or political transition; a revolutionary transition (Mikos, 3 March 2016). One of the most important factors in political change is identity and ideology. Regarding Strategic Culture, “Areas of specific evaluation included geography, shared narratives, and relationships to other groups, threat perception, ideology, and religion.” (Johnson pg5). It is crucial to analyze the Polish identity, the general ideology that many Poles share, as well as their perceptions regarding Russia. These are key indicators of political change and how that will translate into national security policy.

2.1 Religion/Individual State Relationship

First, Poland nowadays is geographically situated in central Europe, although many outside Poland perceive it to be in the east. During the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Second Polish Republic, Poland’s boarders stretched further east than it does today. It covered large parts of modern day Belarus and western Ukraine. In addition, during the latter half of the 20^th century, Poland was under the Iron Curtain and to Western powers that was the east. In a way, perceptions of Poland as being in the east are not wrong, but there is much more to it for Poles. Poland is a Catholic stronghold, its origins are deep and a vast majority of Poles still remain Catholic. Catholicism as a church is in the west, Rome being the home and the traditional language being Latin. For nearly a thousand years, Poland’s relation to the church has been strong to say the least. Even during communism, which attempted to eradicate religion to include Catholicism, sustained some form of existence in Poland. Pope John Paul II, who was a Pole, exercised great influence for Poland during communism and after. His legacy will live on forever. The Catholic Churches influence on Poland is second to none, this is the first of several important differences between Poles and their Russian neighbor. For Russia, Orthodox Christianity was and still is an influential religious denomination. “Orthodoxy developed distinctly from Roman Catholicism in a number of practical and theological ways, among which was the perception of the relationship between church and state.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg318). Not only are the religions different, but also the way in which the religion operated within the state. For Poles, Catholicism played an important role in the state, for Russians not so much. Orthodoxy, “did not draw such a line between political and religious authority, a situation that, some argue, stunted the idea of a society functioning independently of the state.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg319). Not only is there a difference in religious domination, but also the way that Poles view the state and Russians view the state. “Religion may have shaped political culture in a way that influenced how Russians view the relationship between the individual and the state.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg319). This leads to yet another significant difference.

2.2 Democratic Institutionalization

The difference in the way Poles view the relationship between individuals and the state and its institutions, compared to Russians is indeed another key factor in the strategic culture framework. It also plays a crucial role in how Poles view themselves in regard to Russians. “We might argue that no one factor led to Russia’s unique growth of state power and its dearth of democratic institutions.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg319). It is important to emphasize the fact that state power in Russia is extremely high in addition to a lack of stable democratic institutions. Under Putin, democratic structures are highly weak. “While a number of democratic structures have been built since 1991, they remain weakly institutionalized and, under Putin, have been restricted or ignored.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg326). Russia, unlike Poland has had little to no tradition of democratic institutions. There is an obvious correlation between democratic values and the implementation of democratic institutions. For Russians, “surveys consistently show that a majority or plurality of citizens favor state centralization and order over individual freedom.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg347). Where Poles have sought democratic institutions, the Russians, for the most part, have not. Even during the communist period Poland was unlike any other Eastern Bloc state in that it had quite a difficult time adhering to a Soviet type regime system. “The Soviet type regimes, with the exception of Poland, could not be understood in their distinctiveness by including them in the category of an authoritarian regime.” (Linz and Stepan pg268). A key factor is that Poland had democratic institutions prior to communism and the regime change while Russia did not. There was an ideological conflict with Poland and “Soviet type” governmental structures. Simply put, Poland is not a suitable place for a totalitarian communist regime but Russia, who at the time lacked a tradition of democratic institutions, was suitable. Arguably, that is why democratization in Poland has been regarded as a success story and for Russia, not so much. Much of this success can be attributed to the Polish ideology. “Nationalism in these cases is a necessary concomitant to spreading democratization, as national and ethnic groups long denied a voice express themselves in favor of sovereignty and independent existence.” (Taras pg78).

From a national security standpoint, Russia is a threat to the Polish democratic structure and the Catholic way of life. This is a governmental structure and a religious devotion specific to Poles not shared by Russians. The Second Polish Republic and its democratic institutions was attacked by Lenin and his Bolsheviks after WWI and then destroyed by Stalin and the Soviets during WWII. What makes Poles think that it will not happen again? The communists sought to dissolve the Catholic Churches political and religious value from Polish life all together. What makes Poles think that will not happen again? Religion and democratic institutionalization are just two of several more variables in Strategic Culture that impact the national security of Poland, to also include ideology and identity.

2.3 Ideology and Identity

Ideology and identity have always been massive instigators of conflicts throughout human history. It is not surprising that this is a similar case for Poland and Russia. Russia has always been regarded in the east. Its history with the Mongols and Eurasian peoples backs up this notion. For Poles, the notion that they are in the east is not one that many share. According to Professor Michael Mikos, “Poles have been in the West, always. We are the West.” (Mikos, 3 March 2016). A powerful statement such as this drives home the notion that Poles identify themselves more with the west in many aspects including religious and cultural development as well as governmental and political structure and relations. According to Raymond Taras in Consolidating Democracy in Poland, “In 1991, 68 percent of (Polish) respondents said that they liked Americans and only 1 percent that they disliked them.” (Taras pg93). The Polish willingness to belong with the west is exemplified in many aspects of Polish life. “Poles want very much to be like Americans and to avoid resembling Russians, Ukrainians, Gypsies.” (Taras pg93). For many Poles, especially those who experienced communism first hand, would argue that Russia, “is a slave’s nation.” (Mikos, 3 March 2016). What is meant by this is that Russians have always been slaves to the state. Slaves to Mongol occupation, slaves to the Tsars, slaves to Stalin and the Soviets as well as communism as a system. Submission to the state is a way of life that Poles do not necessarily share with the Russians. Even more extreme views do exist within Poland. Some poles believe Russia as “Crude, Rude, and uneducated,” (Mikos, 3 March 2016). This belief stems from history. “Some scholars view this occupation (Mongol Occupation) as the central event that set Russia on a historical path separate from that of the West, one leading to greater despotism and isolation.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg319). Not only that, but it is well known to Poles that Russia never developed the same as Poland and the rest of Europe. Russia was for the most part, “Cut off from European intellectual and economic influences, Russia did not participate in the Renaissance, feel the impact of the Protestant Reformation, or develop a strong middle class.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg319). In a way, a feeling of cultural superiority for Poles is prevalent. After the amount of suffering that Russia imposed on Poles and limited Poland’s ability to grow at the rate of other European country, it is not surprising a large majority of Poles feel this way. This rift between Poland and Russia is deep, it is much more than meets the eye. It begs the question, can relations be repaired between Poland and Russia despite their dark history? According to Michael Mikos, “Not in the short term.” (Mikos, 3 March 2016). There is just too much bad blood between them that history cannot be forgiven and cannot be forgotten at this point. Time heals wounds, but the wounds that Poland suffered are still very fresh and can be exhibited in the political decision making of the Polish government.

2.4 Strategic Culture Politics

Politics in Poland is in a revolutionary period. The elections in the fall of 2015 saw a dramatic change in political leadership. New president Andrzej Duda and his conservative party are now in power. With political change, usually also comes a change in foreign policy. Needless to say, relations between Poland and the United States are quite solid. Poland is a member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and also the EU (European Union), two western organizations. Platforma Obywatelska or civic platform, began in 2001 (platforma.org). It is very much a western oriented program aimed at building social growth, economic development, and an effective state through solidarity (platforma.org). Meanwhile, Russia is failing economically, institutionally, and developmentally. “Russia has become as opaque and resistant to change as it was under communism, a worrying sign for that country and the rest of the world.” (O’Neil, Fields, Share pg317). For Poles, the Russian people are suppressed under a state that is not willing to move forward. It turns out, once again, Russia’s lack of development is continuing to drag Poland down with it. Famed Solidarity movement leader Lech Walesa who also served as president of Poland for a period of time has brought to light a problem within Polish politics and government. A problem that’s roots stem from the Soviet era. Within the Polish government still exists an influence by leaders who were deeply embedded with the Soviets, Lech Walesa being one of them. He was involved with the communists and their secret police and in some cases his actions were borderline treasonous. “In the 1980’s, Walesa skirted dangerously close to treason,” (Chodakiewicz 2009). Many similar cases with other political, military, and police leaders have popped up. Soviet era, communists, who have tried to cover up their past, still have held power and exercised great influence all these years since democratization. Poland is still trying to overcome is political history. There has been, “Invisible Control” by Moscow in Poland all these years despite democratic transition (Mikos 3 March 2016). Still the remnants of old Soviet Russia and its leaders have undermined Polish democracy for years. Yet another unfortunate twist that is now being brought to the political spotlight and actively being addressed by the new Polish leadership. Simply put, “Poland is in the process of coming to grips with its totalitarian past and nothing can reverse the tide.” (Chodakiewicz 2009).

It is evident that history, religion, the relation between the individual and state, institutions and democratization, ideology, identity and political culture under the Strategic Culture framework point out an obvious conflict between Poles and Russians. Each of these factors is a point of contention, add them together, and it is ticking time bomb. The rivalry between Poland and Russia is one that will not cease any time soon. The wounds that Poland suffered at the hands of the Russians will not mend in the near future. The deep disdain the Poles feel unto the Russians does not lead to happy relations. This is why national security between both nations is so very important and something that needs to be addressed. One might say, nations around the world share cultural, religious, and historical disparity with their neighbors yet they live peacefully. That is true, but there are many instances where this is not the case. For example, Iran Iraq, Pakistan India, Israel Palestine. That is why the dilemma between Poland and Russia is so very real and so very dangerous. Strategic Culture analysis has allowed for a better understanding of the underlying factors that continue to drive a rift between nations. Where Strategic Culture is beneficial for national security policy is finding solutions to a dilemma that perhaps do not involve military power and armed conflict. According to Jeffrey S. Lantis in Strategic Culture and National Security Policy, “Strategic cultural dilemmas define new directions for foreign policy and demand the reconstruction of embedded historical narratives. In the spirit of paradigmatic shifts, these changes take time and energy for common acceptance, but they are distinctly new paths.” (Lantis pg112). There needs to be a fundamental change in the way that Poland approaches Russia, at least according the Strategic Culture framework. For instance if Poland decides to work much more closely with Russia, leave NATO, the EU, it will take an astronomical shift in the belief spectrum in order to create common acceptance within Poland. Based on the analysis of the variables under Strategic Culture framework, the evidence suggests that common acceptance is not in the realm of possibility at this point. What is interesting to note is that Poland is facing a political shift of some sort currently, but in many ways it is even more extreme against Russia. It is not shifting the other way trying to appease Russia like it had been since the end of the Cold War, but truly rid of all Russo-Soviet aspects within the government to include people. In addition, what Poland does have going for it is that it is a democratic state. “Democratic states are founded upon embedded national security values that can be tested in the face of Strategic Cultural dilemmas.” (Lantis pg112). Democratic states exhibit flexibility and exercise adaption. “When the contradiction between external conditions and cultural tendencies becomes too great, culture will likely adapt.” (Lantis pg112). Although it is a difficult case to make especially regarding the Polish situation, it is an intriguing argument. If external factors such as war could have a devastating effect, cultural norms or beliefs could likely adapt to find a solution to the problem. Russia has a difficult time adapting to external factors because of the nature of its governmental institutions and cultural norms. Poland has options that Russia simply does not have. The severely crippled Russian economy can barely stand the sanctions currently in place on it. Poland could implement more sanctions. Russia are in the process of expanding its military but facing severe monetary problems. Poland is upgrading their military as well but unlike Russia, it has the proper funding to do so. Putin’s Russia are not in any bargaining position at the moment. With an exception of size factors, Poland seems to have the upper hand.

3.0 Realism

3.1 NATO and the United States of America

How does this military development and power play a role in national security policy for Poland though? This is what international relations theory Realism attempts to explain. First, Poland’s strategic goals must be addressed before moving forward. According to George Friedman in his article, Poland’s Strategy, “Polish national strategy pivots around a single, existential issue: how to preserve its national identity and independence.” (Friedman 2012). This aligns exactly with Strategic Culture and the protection of ideological values that Poles have. Additionally, Friedman also said, “Obviously, close ties with NATO and the European Union are Poland’s first strategic solution.” (Friedman 2012). Poland’s security after leaving the protection of the Warsaw pact during democratic transition was jeopardized seeing as though the Soviets no longer supported Poland militarily. “Since 1991, Poland has sought a unique solution that was not available previously: membership in multilateral organizations such as the European Union and NATO.” (Friedman 2012). This provided Poland with a fantastic security blanket specifically against the Russians. According to the Polish National Security Bureau’s, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, “NATO constitutes the most important form of political and military cooperation between Poland and its allies.” (National Security Bureau pg9). The importance of NATO’s role in the Polish national security platform is immense, “NATO will remain the most important political and military Alliance and guarantor of Poland’s security.” (National Security Bureau pg20). But there is a serious concern over NATO’s viability as a force. For the United States and NATO, upsetting the balance of power by meddling and allying with states on Russia’s doorstep is not the best idea for stability. Along with gaining power, the balance of power is a crucial topic in Realism. “Given the state’s objectives, goals, or purposes in terms of security, it seeks and uses power, which is a key concept to realists as it the balance of power among states.” (Viotti and Kauppi pg40). In addition to this, “The growth of Russian power and potential Russian expansionism that would upset the European balance of power obviously would not be in Washington’s interest.” (Friedman 2012). For the last couple decades, relying on the United States and NATO, was a logical strategy that provided Poland a solution to national security as they worked on other pressing matters such as rebuilding their economy, infrastructure, and government. “The United States of America remains the most important non-European partner of Poland. On the other hand the current potential unreliability of the United States and NATO in protecting Polish interests is beginning to show. For example, Robert Beckhusen stated in his article, Don’t Mess with Poland, “Poland wants to develop an anti-air and anti-missile system of a kind the U.S. would have installed before the Obama administration attempted to restart relations with Russia- and failed at it.” (Beckhusen 2016). This supports the claim that the United States and NATO can be unreliable allies for the Poles. If you pair this unreliability with the unpredictability of Putin’s Russia, it is a serious security concern. “The solution was quite effective while Russia was weak and inwardly focused. But Polish history teaches that Russian dynamics change periodically and that Poland cannot assume Russia will remain weak or benign in perpetuity.” (Friedman 2012). Nowadays Russia is far from being weak and ineffective, in fact, on the contrary. Russia invaded South Ossetia in 2008 absolutely steamrolling the Georgian forces and in 2014 the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Ukraine. Poland must be able to defend itself or at least hold off a Russian attack long enough for the United States or NATO get involved. However, what if help never comes?

3.2 Polish Military

Poland needs to build sufficient enough forces in order to ensure its own defense which is where Realist theory applies. That way if support comes, great, but if it does not, all is not lost. But there is slightly more to it, Strategic Culture also plays into this as well. “Poland’s national strategy inevitably is designed with an underlying sense of fear and desperation.” (Friedman 2012). In 2009, Russia with Belarus conducted military exercises that simulated an invasion and war with Poland. Russia is taking a realist position in the region, expressing their power and capability on Poland’s doorstep. “Bogdan Klich, Polands Defense Minister, said, ‘It is a demonstration of strength.’”(Day 2009). In addition, Marek Opiola a member of the Polish government stated, “It’s an attempt to put us in our place. Don’t forget all this happened on the 70^th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland.” (Day 2009). Russia’s actions ultimately impact Poland’s Strategic Culture. The Russians are not only exercising their power in a Realist capacity, but undermining Polish identity and history in a Strategic Culture capacity. “There’s another reason for Poland’s emphasis on defense: a traumatic history. During the lifetimes of some of the country’s political leaders, and certainly during their parent’s lifetimes, Poland had- for a time- ceased to exist.” (Beckhusen 2016). Fear and desperation could give Poles the drive and edge in a conflict with Russia. The Polish government is converting this fear and desperation into a solution and ultimately action.

It appears that Poland is beefing up its military strength in large numbers. “Poland is a unique member of NATO, where defense budgets among most member states have either stalled or declined in the past decade.” (Beckhusen 2016). Additionally, “The main element of the defense capacities are professional Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. Their technical modernization – unprecedented in terms of scale – which is legally guaranteed, stable and long-term funding of the state’s defense needs, leads to the acquisition of modern military equipment and expansion of operation capabilities.” (National Security Bureau pg14). It appears that the majority of European states are focusing much less on military capability and spending compared to Poland though. The search for power among other NATO states, especially in Western Europe, is driven by economics. This would fit more among the likes of Liberalism instead of Realism, yet Poland is not choosing to go that route in regard to their military. “During that same time, Warsaw doubled its annual military spending- emerging as one of the continent’s leading military powers in terms of funding compared to gross domestic product.” (Beckhusen 2016). To many in international relations, Realism seems to be fading into history. It might appear that its validity decreased with the end of the Cold War, but Poland’s case exhibits otherwise. In this context, Poland’s focus is on what Realists would say is Hard Power. Hard power focuses on military capablilties. (Viotti and Kauppi pg53). As far as spending goes, Poland is up at the top but its military still has some issues included some antiquated vehicles and technology still in use. That trend is rapidly changing though. “Poland has a huge numbers of tanks. Its armed forces is one of the few in Europe- the Russian army being another one- that still invests a substantial sum maintaining, upgrading and buying tanks.” (Beckhusen 2016). Poland’s terrain is relatively flat aside from the southern mountains. Tank warfare is a massive strategic defense that Poland must focus on if a full invasion were to happen. The Polish military learned the hard way during the Nazi Blitzkrieg as tanks drove a knife edge through the countryside. It appears as though the Poles have learned that lesson. “Altogether, this means Poland has the largest tank force in Europe west of the Bug River.” (Beckhusen 2016). Oppositely, Poland is suffering when it comes to aircraft and air-defense. As the air-defense plans that former President George Bush had planned and current President Barrack Obama took off the table, Poland has a hole in their defensibility. (Beckhusen 2016). This political debacle caused Poles to take it upon themselves to develop their own. “Warsaw never gave up on the idea of a more expansive system. The result is a new anti-air and anti-missile system called the Shield of Poland. And there’s no doubt who- Russian president Vladimir Putin, of course- it’s designed to defend against.” (Beckhusen 2016). As Poland continues to strengthen its military and spend a large deal of money, some may see this as a waste of resources or pointless spending. “It’s certainly ambitious. It might be too ambitious- bordering on paranoia. But is it paranoid if you’re within striking distance of Russia?” (Beckhusen 2016). Recent events like the Ukrainian Civil War show that Russia is very much so in striking distance. “The reassertion of Russia’s position as a major power at the expense of its neighborhood, as well as the escalation of its confrontational policy, an example of which is the conflict in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, has a negative impact on security in the region.” (National Security Bureau pg21). Poland borders Ukraine and that is a serious national security threat. As military battles rage on in Ukraine, political battles rage on in Poland.

3.3 Realist Politics

Poland’s Andrzej Duda has been duking it out with Putin in the political ring in recent months. The Russian threat has been a popular issue in domestic Polish politics. According to Sputnik International, “Poland not only loyally joined in with the sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and the EU – it went out of its way to demonize Moscow, through war paranoia at home and calls for ‘tougher measures’ against Russia, including military bases on its soil, from Brussels and Washington.” These actions would be regarded by Realists as an exhibition of Soft Power. Soft power, “Comes, for example, from cultural dimensions or the values that define the identity and practices of a state to include the diplomatic capacity to influence other states bilaterally or multilaterally in the international organizational contexts.” (Viotti and Kauppi pg53). Poland is playing hardball with Russia diplomatically trying to undermine Russia any chance they get. Putin quite often fires back but to no avail. Current Polish President Andrzej Duda recently stated, “I sleep so deeply that he could walk all over me, and I wouldn’t wake up.” (Sputnik International 2016). Duda is obviously not intimidated by Putin, but there is a fine line between intimidation and provocation. In addition, “Duda said that while he would continue to work and would not ‘fold his hands’ in diplomacy, he finds it more important for Poland to seek ‘good cooperation in the framework of the EU’ than to work with Russia.” (Sputnik International 2016).

In the near future, political relations between Poland and Russia look very gloomy. Poland is approaching Russia with a Realist mentality, seeking power in the region and exchanging political blows frequently. “The realist emphasis on the conditions of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities or power among states.” (Viotti and Kauppi pg55). The inherent state of anarchy in the international system puts Poland in a predicament. It wants to face Russia and not back down; Poles do not want Russia walking all over them. On the other hand, Russia is Poland’s number one threat. Russia is the regional hegemon and strongest military force in Europe. Poland must act cautiously as things heat up in the region, especially in Ukraine. Also, an anarchical system is a self-help system. “Finally, an anarchical, self-help system obviously makes cooperation among states difficult to achieve.” (Viotti and Kauppi pg57). Not only are Poland and Russia fierce foes that makes cooperation difficult to impossible already, the anarchical system of Realism does not help. Although Poland has relatively reliable friends, it must continue to seek more power militarily and politically. It simply is in Poland’s best interest to do so. If Poland does not continue to learn from the past, it is bound to repeat itself.

Conclusion

Overall, Russia’s national security threat to Poland cannot be underestimated. After all, history provides substantial evidence of this threat. Strategic culture provides the best way to analyze the ideological differences between Poles and Russians. This plays a direct role in how Poland approaches Russia regarding national security. Realism provides the best way to analyze Poland’s national security decision making from a military and hard power perspective. Poland’s geographic position in the center of Europe poses its own set of defensibility problems and recent Russian aggression does nothing but force Poles to make crucial national security decisions. Paired together, strategic culture and realism provide two explanations of the complex Polish Russian relationship. When combined, a well-rounded insight into this relationship is exhibited. The historical wounds run deep for Poles, and at least in the short term, relations will not get better especially as Putin threatens Poland’s front doorstep with aggressive military actions. Poland’s significant economic and military growth since democratization has been a success story for Europe and a role model for other former soviet bloc states seeking a way out of the cold war quick sand that continues to keep them trapped. Poland’s strong national unity, shared ideology, and willingness to seek power will help them triumph over the Russian threat.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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