There are questions that surrounds two organizations that are pivotal in European politics and collective interdependent. One of which, The North Atlantics Treaty Organization or NATO, is purely defined and created as a defensive alliance interdependent organization. NATO was created as a deterrence system in the aftermath of WWII. Europeans and indeed much of the world were war weary, more concerned with economic expansion and regional stability during this time, primarily aimed at keeping at bay extremist forces that threatened their prosperity, chiefly the Soviet Union. Likewise the Soviets viewed NATO and their actions as an aggressive force, causing Soviet states to become more interdependent on fellow communist states, mainly this is evident with the Warsaw Pact.
Keeping peace and maintaining the status quo for reconstruction and economic expansion post world war two was the primary concern for most, including the USA. In retrospect there were ideas on how to be more efficient through the great boom of the 50s. One of these ideas led to agreements on the European community or EC which initiated talks of trade and cooperation between Germany and France, which eventually formed into the current 28 member European Union. The EU was formed through deepening and expansion policies through its life cycle. As countries became more interdependent and acceptant to the role of the EC and EU more policies and treaties formed the role of comparable lose federal governmental body, dismissing sovereignty and legitimacy of the nation state.
Indeed the EU was formed out of the EC with its own monetary system, humanitarian laws, judiciary, parliament, bureaucracies and councils. The only real area the EU was lacking at the time of formation is primarily in foreign policy and security. However, the onset of the civil war in Yugoslavia shifted the spotlight of domestic policies into external polices. The EU found that there could be potential of a spillover effect from the conflict, thus when EU policy makers had the opportunity to take action, their role began in negotiations and financial support for conflict resolutions and security. The most obvious reasoning for action on the EU’s behalf could be that it was good for business. Furthermore, this conflict being in Europe and the nature of how it was unfolding there were echoes of the atrocities committed during WWII continuing into this conflict, possibly with the same motives and prejudice that were ongoing for the past half century. Post Balkans, the EU continued its peacekeeping initiatives, however the scale is not as large, speaking strictly in budgetary terms. Typically NATO primary operation have an immense overhead, and the EU may lack the effectiveness and efficiency of the more prestigious NATO peacekeeping operation. Additionally, the US is still seen as giving some form of aid to the EU during these periods of peacekeeping in Europe well into the late 2000s.
Well into the 2000s the EU is still maintaining a global initiative in the foreign policy arena, while most of these operations are for humanitarian initiatives and peacekeeping in former colonies such as Mali which is led by its former colonial master France, and notably with some assistance from the US. With an external foreign policy that is more aggressive, it’s fair to say that some members may be tempted to opt out of the traditional NATO option first and rely on mechanism from institutions that are more readily available for inclusions in the decision making process. When there is a shift in power or new actors participating in global decisions, how do the old institutions make room for the newer ones? Regarding NATO, is there a clear definition on its role post-cold war? Will the EU have a more concrete role in foreign policy? Finally, is there a dichotomous relationship with the EU and NATO?
This research attempts to address the role of NATO and the EU in the 21st century through clubs good theory and rational choice. NATO and the EU maintain operations that are primarily considered as exclusionary international organizations made up of member states. However, given the special relationships with outside member states that receive benefits from the organizations how has NATO or the EU diminished their role as an exclusionary actor, while offering benefits to nonmember states including international collaboration between the EU and NATO respectively.
Literature Review
Methodology
The research’s purpose is to show and discuss the roles of NATO and the EU through the lens of the club goods theory. Essentially, the clubs good theory is a broad in subject matter as goods could be considered any item that is offered by the organization in a collective form. For simplifications purposes, there will be two main goods that will be compared between both organizations. The first good is NATO’s collective defense posture or what international relations calls physical security. NATO will be examined as any operation that existed in the defense of NATO members and if NATO’s policies in defense deviated in any form to non-member countries. The basis behind this is to evaluate in the club goods product that is being offered by the member in exclusionary and cannot be accessed from non-members.
Excludability will also be an indicator with rational choice, meaning if any non-member receives aid in the form of physical security and is not a member nor became a member then the good in not club in form, therefore rational actors will not seek membership. The EU is measured by its main theme of economic expansionism. Here the measurement is the ease of trade, openness of borders, monetary union and protectionism policies from external actors. Again, the members will seek membership only if these benefits through club goods are only offered to the members or potential members, and like NATO rational members will seek membership if the benefit outweighs the cost.
For both the EU and NATO the examination will be expressly limited to the conflict in the Balkans. NATO’s operations will be examined to see if the goods that were distributed were for the common good of the collective alliance. Likewise the EU also participated in the operations within the Balkans. The operational cost of conducting these operations must be less than the gains felt by the EU. Finally if there are any potential relationships between the EU and NATO for the duration of the Yugoslav civil war one actor may supplement and carry over more benefits that non-members may receive, thus reducing the benefit for joining or maintaining that relationship for the other alliance.
NATO
NATO’s Roots and Roles in the Past (Cold War)
The treaty that formed NATO, known as the Washington Treaty, was finalized in Washington DC on the 4th April 1949, which was original ratified by twelve founding members. The treaty its self is short, a mere 14 articles and is championed by NATO as being unaltered and sticking to its core principles, mainly to article five which forms the backbone of the treaty.
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
The treaty is elegantly short and there was little deliberation in such a short time for the amount of effort and scope that it entailed so many states to act cooperatively. Why did these states give up their defensive sovereignty so quickly? The NATO members who initially formed this treaty for some time were deeply concerned with the soviet threat in Eastern Europe. During the aftermath of the Second World War the states that were victorious against the axis powers were restructuring the political and geographical map of Europe. According to David Yost in NATO’s Rebalancing act (2014), Stalin remarked to a group of communist Yugoslavs in April of 1945
This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach
Stalin was clear, he would not allow free elections in central and Eastern Europe that were under Soviet influence, and thus there was no honoring the Yalta conference’s agreement of February 1945 (Yost, 2014). By Potsdam Stalin’s intentions were made clear, “any freely elected government would be anti-Soviet and that we cannot permit”, Stalin further elaborated in 1948 that he felt deep regret for not liberating Italy and France with the Soviet military and in his view there was a failure of empowering the communist forces of western and southern Europe (Yost, 2014). However, even more strikingly there was an alarming rate of expansionism from the Soviet state, the only great allied power to actively acquire and absorb more territories (Yost, 2014). The Soviet Union acquired the states of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, while taking territories from Czechoslovakia, Finland and completely Russianized the former German state of Prussia (Yost, 2014).
While territorial gains were made, estimated around 492,600 square km, the Soviet Union also controlled state governments that it had liberated, whilst maintaining a hostile and aggressive relationship with western states, effectively blocking Berlin by rail and road from June 1948 until May 1949 (Yost, 2014). During this period the western states became increasing more proactive in discussion with the possibilities of collective defensive postures in Europe (Yost, 2014) (NATO, 2016). Dialogue was already underway with the Brussels treaty in March 1948, this was due to the United States rhetoric indicating that US military forces would only protect Europe if there is a united European effort (NATO, 2016). The Brussels Treaty signed in March 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands was a response to the US posture and signaled that there was a common defense policy within Europe, which effectively became the prelude to the Washington Treaty (NATO, 2016).
From the United States perspective the Neutrality act indicated to Adolf Hitler that his actions on one state is minimal in consequences, where by the collect cooperation between several states would counter balance the repercussions felt by the aggressor (Yost, 2014). Debates between senators as to the validity of the Treaty became evident, as in the senate hearings surrounding the treaty, secretary of state Dean Acheson was asked
Are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to these countries’ capacity to resist? Acheson replied, the answer to the Question, senator, is a clear and absolute ‘No. (Yost, 2014)
While these question might have indicated that there is little chance that that there will be an effective fighting force in the European theater, Senator Arthur Vandenberg raised the issue of the neutrality posture verses a stance
Senator, so far as I am concerned, I think a man can bore for this treaty and not vote for a nickel to implement it, because so far as I am concerned, the opening sentence of the treaty is a notification to Mr. Stalin which puts him exactly the contrary position to that which Mr. Hitler was in, because Mr. Hitler saw us with the Neutrality act. Mr. Stalin now sees us with a pact of cooperative action. (Yost, 2014)
The aftermath was the Vandenberg resolution in June 1948, which laid the ground work for the United States to enter in a collective self-defensive alliance during peacetime. The Brussels treaty states, the United States and Canada put forth the Washington Treaty, while the core drafters of the treaty were compromised from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Other countries from the Brussels treaty were active with the initial discussions with a working group that is referred to the “six power talks” (NATO, 2016). Formally the treaty negotiations began 10 December 1948 in Washington DC, there Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Italy and Portugal all were participants of the concluding negotiations which started on 8 March 1949 (NATO, 2016).
NATO’s role when formed was not necessarily considered isolated just in terms of a military alliance for the protection of the transatlantic countries, yet more as a stabilizer for the post WWII Western European members (Union) or what is commonly referred to as the WEU. The founders of the WEU included all the Brussels treaty states whom in turn invited West Germany and Italy to join to form the WEU in 1954, while West Germany eventually being incorporated into NATO by 1955 (McCormick, Olsen, 2014). The WEU was far more symbolic than the defensive posture it held onto previously with the Brussels treaty, it was a statement of unity for Europe. Regardless the ideas that conceptualized a defensive Europe brought about a transatlantic relationship and the United States would back the concept. In the words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson
[NATO is] the vehicle for American stabilizer role in Western Europe… [NATO is] not merely a military structure to prepare collective defense against military aggression, but also a political organization to preserve to peace for Europe (Ivanov, 2011)
NATO Enlargements
The enlargement of NATO is largely controversial and varies from country. The United States maintains that NATO should include smaller weaker countries that are more susceptible to attack or in the past from Soviet aggression (NATO, 2016). The United Kingdom however, sought to keep the alliance tighter knit and smaller in scoop, keeping the mission more directed to larger threats that are pressing to the founding members while not getting bogged down in smaller conflicts and distractions (NATO, 2016). Meanwhile, France and Belgium still had colonial possessions, Algeria and the Congo that could benefit from NATO involvement and inclusion (NATO, 2016). France was able to finagle Algeria into their political system and administration under the umbrella of NATO however by the conclusion of the Algeria war of independence in 1962 the article dealing with French Algeria became irrelevant (NATO, 2016).
Until the 1980s only three countries were admitted into NATO prior to 1982, being Greece and Turkey first in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 (Yost, 2014). Spain was able to join following their democratization from the Fascist Franco Regime in 1982. Almost a decade later in 1989 the Warsaw Pact disintegrated ushering in a wave of western influences into Eastern Europe, giving way to three post-cold war enlargement waves. The first wave in 1997 invited the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungry, whom were admitted into the alliance in 1999 (Yost, 2014). The second wave by 2004 brought Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia into the fold and additionally Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania who were all former Soviet republics (Yost, 2014). Finally, Croatia and Albania were formally admitted into NATO by April 2009 (Yost, 2014).
The Role in post-cold war non-article five operations (Balkans)
As stated previously, NATO’s primary role is seen mainly as a defensive alliance, however there is a fundamental change that is transpiring on where the emphasis of who or what NATO is defending against. Traditionally the role of NATO eventually morphed to counter balance the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union post-world war two. During this period on 14 May 1955 the Soviet system set up a reflecting defensive alliance in the Eastern bloc called the Warsaw pact. The Warsaw was formed in Warsaw Poland at the presidential palace and the pact’s mission was too protect allied communist states, maintain the status quo for the political systems and buffered the Soviet republics. After the fall of the Soviet system and the disintegration of this system several problems arise such as to who and what is NATO protecting against.
Since 1991 NATO has set forth the strategic concepts documents which outlines the overall political objectives and military postures that it faces (Yost, 2014). The Strategic Concepts prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc has classified, yet there seemed to have been some need to clarify just what the role of NATO needs to be during this evolutionary period (Yost, 2014). The Strategic Concepts documents of 1991 details an emphases of defensive postures in NATO, explicitly regarding the territorial sovereignty of its members, namely through article five worded in the Strategic concepts documents under part II paragraph fifteen (see Appendix B) (Yost, 2014). However given what is worded from the 1991 documents there has been little foresight on what would transpire with the Balkans that would require non-article five operations. However the strategic concepts documents outlines in paragraph fifteen the importance of upholding of article five as well as the 1990 London Declaration, the declaration states in the second paragraph
The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No-one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty. (NATO, 2000)
NATO has stated that there needs to be an “agent of change”, according to Yost (2014) this vehicle of deliver to the developing European states was the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE set up the conference in Paris to coordinate the creation of the institutions needed while the Rome summit in November 1991 reaffirmed the commitment for states to identify the “common code of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security and economic liberty” (Yost, 2014).
The beginnings of NATO new era into the 21st century appeared to be coordinate a smoother transition from the post-cold war and create a dialogue with the WEU and former Warsaw pact members. Additionally there were instances where the old system in the east brought some stability in ethnic issues whereas when the disintegration did occurred these checks that maintained the status quo also evaporated. Examples could be felt all over the Eastern bloc. Some of these instances were from the tensions that were between the Slovaks and the Czechs and then the eventually separation Czechoslovakia into now the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Governments were rising and falling the far eastern portions of Europe, notably the issues can be seen today with Ukraine were there are ethnic tensions with the eastern (ethnically Russian influenced) and western portions of the country. Moldova and Belarus are other notable governments that have a history of Russian influences that are struggling with the new found identity issue within Europe as well.
However the most pressing issue for the WEU is the collapse of the former Yugoslavia Republics, in quick secessions as a domino effect from north to south. Slovenia and Croatia were the first to declare their independence in 1991. The ethnic tensions that followed prompted the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pass a resolution in April 1993 to set up safe zones within Bosnia (Ivanov, 2011). The UNSC authorized the use of peacekeepers called United Nations Protective Force (UNPORFOR) to monitor to situation (Ivanov, 2011). NATO was chosen as the military muscle to enforce this operation and ensure the safe zones around Sarajevo were effective, and for NATO this operation was considered the first cornerstone into its new evolutionary role into non-article five operations (Ivanov, 2011).
Traditionally as hinted previously by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the United States has been known to be the primary contributor to the hard power of the Transatlantic Alliance, however the UNSC wanted a more proactive Europe to contribute to the stability of its own continent. Therefore the UNSC set up two different zones of influence within the Bosnian operation through the UN, one would be administers by NATO forces and the other from WEU members thus giving the two international organizations more dialogue for the operation (Ivanov, 2011). The WEU in conjunction with NATO under the auspices of the UN, led an arms embargo on the entirety of Yugoslavia and economic sanctions were enforced onto Serbia and Montenegro (Yost, 2014). The arms embargo was controversial at the time as it was argued by the United States that it favor the already armed forces of Serbia and the under armed forces that were resisting the aggression, whereas the United States had the perspective to lift and strike, as the operations were targeted towards the well-armed Bosnian Serbs while arming the opposition forces (Yost, 2014). NATO’s first military operation, Operation Deliberate Force (ODF), was launched on 30 August 1995 (Ivanov, 2011) (Yost, 2014). ODF was a reaction to Serbian paramilitary bombings that were occurring in Sarajevo and atrocities that occurred Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 (Ivanov, 2011). NATO flew 3,400 bombing sorties in just two weeks and conducted 338 targeted individual bombing runs (Ivanov, 2011). The overall objective of ODF was to break the Bosnian Serbian Forces and bring about a peaceful resolution to the Bosnian Conflict (Yost, 2014). The use of military force by ODF is said to have attributed to the Serbs finally coming to the table for the Paris agreements in November-December 1995 and eventually to the Dayton Peace Accords (Ivanov, 2011).
Post-Dayton Peace Accords tasked NATO’s as the backbone of the multinational peacekeeping force (IFOR). IFOR’s role was a transformational role in the form of peacekeeping operations that had a mandated shelf life of one year (Ivanov, 2011). The IFOR role was to collect heavy weapons and dispose of them, reconstructions of civic buildings, patrol airspaces around Bosnia and demobilize paramilitary forces with its area of operations (Ivanov, 2011). However, it became evident the IFOR role would not be concluded with the one year expiration term (Ivanov, 2011). When the term expired the international community that authorized the use of the IFOR transformed the entity into the Stabilizing Force (SFOR) which would carry on much of the same duties as the IFOR (Ivanov, 2011). The SFOR carried on a few more duties to include operations that hunted down war criminals, more civil reconstruction efforts and safeguarding the environment through peacekeeping and arms control measures in addition to demining operations (Ivanov, 2011). SFOR mission remained active until 2004, after which Bosnia was deemed dramatically stabilized (Ivanov, 2011).
The post-SFOR mission or operation Althea, formulated during the Berlin Plus agreement is largely conducted by the same EU countries that participated in the previous SFOR although dramatically reduced in size and still the EU states cooperate and utilizes the assistance of the NATO administrative functions (Ivanov, 2011). NATO forces may have been able to bring about peace within Kosovo through the Dayton Peace accords, yet by 1998 Serbia-Kosovo tension were escalating to the point ethnic aggression (Ivanov, 2011). The United States during both Bush and the Clinton administration’s took a hard stance regarding Kosovo, as Bush the senior stated
In the Event of Conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian actions, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper (Yost, 2014)
While Bush’s successor administration carried out the same rhetoric, Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated
We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia (Yost, 2014)
The conflict with Kosovo is perspectival different in magnitude, not necessarily in a geographical sense in scale, but more of a peacemaking-keeping latitude on both fronts of the conflict. Kosovo, was previously an autonomous province within Yugoslavia populated mostly by ethnic Albanians, was stripped of its autonomy by 1989 when Slobodan Milosevic stripped the autonomous province for conciliatory powers in the ascension to the presidency (Ivanov, 2011). For most of the durations of the 1990s, the resistance to the Serbian overlords by ethnic Albanians was largely non-violent, however by the latter part of the 1990s the resistance movement led by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) became more militaristic and targeted the majority led Serbian institutions (Ivanov, 2011). From the realm of international relations the subject of Kosovo and Serbia was more complex. Kosovo was merely regarded as a region of Serbia, so the posture poised was maintaining the status quo during the mid-1990s (Ivanov, 2011).
By late 1998 Serbian forces were retaliating to resistance in the province with mass killings, many of whom were non-combatants (Ivanov, 2011). The international community that was observing the violence within the region called the Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia, proposed a plan to end the conflict called the Hill process (Ivanov, 2011). The Hill process did not seek a separation or end game for the region of Kosovo, but more inclusionary avenues of governance for the ethnic majority within Kosovo through levels of governmental participation and more autonomy from Serbia (Ivanov, 2011). Similarly, the UNSC devised resolution 1199 demanding cessations of hostility between the two parties or there would be a NATO led operation of force to resolve the issue (Ivanov, 2011). Milosevic Agreed to the cessation of activities, although a massacred happed shortly after in Racak where forty civilians were claimed to have been killed by Serbian forces (Ivanov, 2011).
It became evident that the negotiations within Belgrade between the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and the Serbian government had dramatically deteriorated to the point of no return, the Allies fearfully of a breakdown and what British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared “to avert a humanitarian disaster”, NATO launched Operation Allied Force (OAF) (Yost, 2014). Over 78 days there were 38,000 sorties and 10,484 strike sorties on Serbian forces. It became clear that the Serb forces within Serbia were more resilient to military action than that of Serbs within the Bosnia during the 21 day military action of ODF (Yost, 2014). By 3 June 1999, Milosevic met with Finnish and Russian envoys in Belgrade, there Milosevic came to the realization that the world community was resolutely behind the allied campaign (Yost, 2014). Milosevic realizing his isolation from the international community withdrew all Serbian forces from Kosovo as underlined from UNSC resolution 1244, which paved the way for the NATO led Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) (Yost, 2014). The UNSC resolution 1244 never recognized Kosovo independence, regardless by 2008 it declared its independence and the majority of NATO and EU member states recognize its independence and the only EU and NATO states Slovakia, Greece, Romania and Spain EU member states do not recognize Kosovo (Yost, 2014). Cyprus is the only EU non-NATO member that does not recognize Kosovo independence (Yost, 2014).
The European Union
There have been Europeans in the past that have dreamed of making some semblance of a united Europe that casts away the ideology of national governments and more European interdependency. Yet realization and foundations of this dream did not come to fruition in a single point of time yet the birth of the European Union can be found in the middle of the 20th century during the great economic boom in Europe following WWII. In April 1951 the Treaty of Paris can be called the “conception” of the EU. The Treaty of Paris created the European Coal and Steel community which conceptualized regional European trade and dependency. Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet devised a plan, or known as the Schuman Declaration, detailed an amazing treaty that would bring about mutual dependency on trade between the Steel and coal community by eliminating the national governments and industrial cartels grip on the production capabilities of these commodities (McCormick, Olsen, 2014). Ultimately this would mitigate and extinguish any possibilities of war being declared by the two countries from resources on their borders. Additionally, Italy and the three Benelux countries Belgium, the Netherlands and Holland also signed the Treaty (McCormick, Olsen, 2014).
By 1957 another step was taken when the ECSC countries created the European Economic Community (EEC) in the Treaty of Rome (McCormick, Olsen, 2014). The EEC created institutions that the EU still utilizes in the modern era, Councils of Ministers, the Commission, parliament and the Courts of Justice (McCormick, Olsen, 2014). In addition to the EEC, the treaty of Rome also created the European Atomic and Energy Community (Euratom).
NATO and The EU Security integration
“The European Union in the Security of Europe” Pgs 120-131
“The European Security and Defense Policy” Pgs 83-85 Crisis Management programs
Discussion
NATO is seen to have played an active role during the Bosnian conflict, the chief advantages from the conflict as it applies to the club goods theory is threefold. First, the conflict achieved the overall objective described from a United States perspective, which is to act as an “American stabilizer from western Europe”. Indeed Yugoslavia may not pertain to the west generally, yet the state was surrounded by a plethora of NATO and WEU allies. The chance of a spill over war was too great for NATO to remain inactive, therefore article four would be the most logical route for NATO to actively participate in the UNPORFOR. Secondly, the operation gave potential member states the incentive to participate in European stability operations. Former communist States such as the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungry and Bulgaria all recognize if their participation was notable during this first non-article five operation, there would be deep considerations for their admittance into the transatlantic Alliance, and indeed by OAF they were active members of NATO.
The exact basis of their participation offered them essentially exclusive rights of passage into the organization, along with their continual tract record of aspiring to the western ideology and values. However the third point is the failure for the Strategic concepts of not perceiving a future breakdown. The transatlantic alliance may not have failed to act when the time came for the conflict in the Balkans, yet there was underlying warning strategically to notify its members and potential members that crises management and reaction was needed. NATO since the 1991 Strategic Concepts documents has updated its goals since then. The 1999 revision to its goals broadens its scope to include what occurred during the Balkans. Hence the 1999 Strategic concepts states
6. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region. (NATO, 1999)
Here NATO’s Strategic Concepts evolves into a regional dialect, where previously there is strong emphasis on the member states, whereas in 1999 stability in this region gives more berth to the potential actions of NATO.
Conclusion
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